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1. Introduction  
DNS is a hierarchical distributed system resolving domain names to IP addresses. In recent years, more and more 
network heretics exploit DNS to conduct illegal activities for it is poorly monitored and typically allowed passed 
network boundaries [1]. For example, P2P botnets fast-flux the IP and domain to avoid detection and increase 
resilience [2]; DNS tunnels are used as covert channel to transfer sensitive information by malicious users. A lot of 
DNS tunnel tools such as DNScat, TCP-over-DNS, Iodine and Ozyman are available on the Internet [3]. Many 
methods have been proposed detecting DNS tunnels, but there are still massive gaps remaining in detecting them in 
real time and effectively. 
Figure 1 shows the working mechanism of DNS tunnels. Usually many channels between malicious insider and 
Internet are blocked by firewall or intrusion expect for HTTP, DNS and SMTP etc. The DNScat server is outside of 
the organization and is 
be sent to the DNScat server. The DNScat client inside the organization encodes sensitive data 
in the DNS queries in base32 or base64 format, and generates query domains ended .
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Abstract 
DNS (Domain Name System) tunnels can provide high-bandwidth covert channels that pose a significant risk to sensitive 
information inside the company networks. Sensitive data are embedded in DNS query and response packets to exfiltrate and 
infiltrate the network boundaries. However, traditional Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and Firewalls let DNS packets pass 
without any checking. This paper explores a novel approach to detect in real time whether a DNS packet is in a tunnel by scoring 
the query domain based on bigram. Experiment shows that the bigrams of domains follow Zipf s law whereas tunnelled traffic is 
obedient to random distribution. The score mechanism in detecting DNS tunnels is proved to be usable theoretically and is 
confirmed in the experiment. Our approach can get a high accuracy of 98.74% and low false positive of 1.24%. 
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sends these packets to the local DNS server. The local DNS server cannot resolve the domain, it will recursively 
forward the DNS packet to the up-level DNS server finally the DNS query will be routed to the DNScat Server.
The DNScat server decodes the client's data from the domain name and processes it, and then it encodes the result
data in the response packets and sends it back to the client. So the malicious user finishes an illegal communication
[4]. 
DNScat client
Local DNS ServerDNScat Server
DNS Query
Recursive Query
IP Traffic
Internet
blocked or monitored
Figure 1 DNS Tunnel workflow
Some features can distinguish DNS tunnels from conventional packets. Those include DNS traffic volume, the
length of domain in DNS queries and the randomness of the domain name. However, DNS traffic volume is a
statistic feature so it cannot detect DNS tunnels in real time; DNS tunnels such as DNScat can set the length of 
domain names to escape detection based on domain s length; Existing method uses Shannon Entropy [5] to identify 
the randomness of a domain name for detecting DNS tunnel, but it maybe treat normal domains such as baidu.com
as an abnormal case as it could get a high entropy.
In this paper, we propose such an approach that detects DNS tunnels based on bigram in real time. The key
features of the approach are as follows:
Real-time: we use bigram character frequency to identify the randomness of a monitored domain name and the
feature can be detected and calculated in real time. So our approach is real time.
Effective: DNS tunnel domains are obedient to random distribution. Our approach uses the frequency of bigram 
to identify the randomness of the domain names to decrease false positive. Experiment shows the approach can 
get 98.74% accuracy and less than 1.24% false positive.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss existing DNS tunnel tools and
existing solutions for detecting DNS Tunnels. In section 3, we introduce our score mechanism and prove the
effectiveness of the approach. Section 4 introduces the details of system implementation, and then evaluates the 
efficiency of our approach in experiments. Section 5 gives a conclusion and discusses some future improvement of 
our approach.
2. Background and Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, existing DNS Tunnels includes time-interval based tunnels and data-embedded 
based tunnels [6]. The former one use the interval time of packets as one bit to exfiltrate or infiltrate information. 
The capacity of time-interval based tunnels is very small, so the related tools are very few. Our target focuses on
detecting data-embedded based tunnels.
Due to the growing proliferation of DNS tunnel tools, many research activities have been focused on network 
flow analysis and randomness detection of domain. Existing network flow analysis methods detect DNS tunnels by 
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analyzing DNS channel volume and packet size features [7]. The feature of DNS channel volume needs a period of 
time to detect so it cannot give the alarm in real time [8]. Wenke Lee proposed to use Shannon Entropy to test the 
randomness of domain in Next-Generation DNS Monitoring Tools on Cyber Security Division 2012 Principal 
the problem of high false positive that some normal domain 
names  have high Shannon Entropy since the theory ignoring different characters having 
different frequencies and longer domains having higher entropies.  
Kenton Born and Dr. David Gustafson proposed using character frequency analysis to detect DNS tunnels and 
their approach is the most related to ours [9]. Both the approaches are based on that normal domain names follow 
 domain names are obedient to random distribution. Their 
approach detects s character frequencies 
distribution and comparing the distribution to the character frequency fingerprint of legitimate domain traffic. The 
key idea of our approach is the score mechanism that based on bigram character frequency which can distinguish 
normal domain names and random ones. The main difference from ours is that their approach uses statistical feature 
and cannot indicate the malicious DNS channel in real time. Furthermore, their approach will lose efficacy when the 
background network flow is big enough. While our approach proposed in this paper can detect DNS tunnels in real 
time. Even only one DNS tunnel packet passes our system, we can detect it at a high probability. 
3. Score Mechanism 
The score mechanism is the key idea of our approach and its performance determine the result of our approach. 
In this section we will introduce the score mechanism, and then prove the effectiveness under certain assumption. 
 
3.1. Character Frequency Analysis 
 
Figure 2 Domain Names Bigram Character Frequency Distribution 
The character frequency analysis is the foundation of our approach and the method has successfully been used in 
cipher text detection [10]. Normal domain names are strings carefully selected by humans and should be 
recognizable and memorable by humans. Therefore domain names closely follow the natural language 
s law which means most normal domain names character frequency will 
concentrate on a small part of high frequency characters. While DNS tunnel domain names are embedded in data 
and the embedded data are encoded with Base32 or Base64 to present as a normal DNS packet, they are obedient to 
random distribution the same as cipher text.  
The bigram character frequency distributions of normal domain names and DNS tunnel domain names are shown 
in Figure 2.The dataset of normal domain names is collected from Alexa [11] that publish one million most popular 
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website and we use the top 100,000 websites  domain names. The dataset of DNS tunnel are produced by DNScat. 
Bigram character frequency of normal domain names approximate the curve of function f(x)=1/x and they 
 The character frequency of DNS tunnel domain names contains three stages. The first 
one is a small part of sharp declining with high frequency stage for the domain names produced by DNScat having 
-over-
lower frequency because of DNScat encoding schema using less numbers. Therefore DNS tunnels domain names 
closely follow random distribution.  
 
3.2. Score Mechanism Design 
The approach we propose use the expect value of bigram character frequency as the score of a domain, as 
 
 
( 1)
j
levels j
levels
freq gram
Score
len n
   (1)
  Where gramj is the jth gram of one level of a domain name, freq(g) is the frequency of the gram g, levels is the 
levelth of the domain name, len is the length of a single level domain, n is the meta number of gram. In this paper, 
we use bigram to calculate the character frequency, so n is 2. 
example. 
provide much information about a domain. Then it is a domain of one level. All of the bigrams are 
The next is to get the frequencies of these bigrams from a bigram character frequency 
table generated in the off-line training stage. Finally we sum these frequencies and divide it by the number of 
bigrams to calculate the score of a domain. 
 
3.3. Score Mechanism Analysis 
The character frequencies of norm [9] and we verify it in our examination. That is  
 
(1)( ) freqfreq i
i   (2) 
 
Where i is the rank of bigram ordered by the character frequencies descending, freq(i) is the character frequency 
of ith bigram. 
 
We assume that the character frequency of DNS tunnel domain names follow random distribution. Then the 
character frequency values follow uniform distribution. So we can get their expect value namely their average scores: 
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Where freq(i) is the frequency of the ith bigram. 
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Whereas normal domain names follow , most of normal domain names bigram will locate the small
part of high character frequencies. So the expected value of normal domains scores will be a little higher. It is
2( )nomal
i
Score freq i
(4)
The characters allowed in a domain name are a subset of the ASCII character set, and includes the characters a
through z, A through Z, digits 0 through 9, and the hyphen [12]. $
So the bigram number is 64*64=4096. Then we can calculate that randomScore is 0.000251952 and nomalScore is 
0.0209344. The latter is 83 times of the former. Therefore we can conclude that the score mechanism can be used to 
distinguish DNS tunnels and conventional channels.
4. System & Evaluation
The system includes two parts: Off-Line Training Mode and On-Line Classifying Mode. As shown in Figure 3 , 
character frequency table and classifier are produced in the Off-Line Training part and are used to classify in the
On-Line Classifying part.
O
ff
-L
in
e
Tr
ai
ni
ng
M
od
e
O
n-
Li
ne
Cl
as
si
fy
in
g
M
od
e
Character
Frequncy
Table
Normal
domain names
Normal
domain names
DNS
Tunnul
domain names
Character
Frequency
Statistic
Normal domain
names score
DNS Tunnel
domain names
score
domain
name score
the domain
name class
Classfier
A domain
name
Figure 3 System Overview
4.1. Data Collection
In the evaluation experiment we used 5 data sets: the normal domain names used to get character frequency table,
the normal domain names for off-line training, DNS Tunnel domain names for off-line training, the normal domain 
names used for evaluation and the DNS Tunnel domain names used for evaluation.
The data sets are from two resources. All the normal domain names are from the one million domain names
published by Alexa. The first normal domain names are top 100,000, the second ones are the top 10,000 and the last
ones are the 10,001~20,000. All the DNS tunnels domain names are produced by DNScat and one half is used as
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training data and the left half is used as evaluation data. 
4.2. Off-Line Training Mode 
The Off-Line Training Mode contains four steps. 
 Preprocessing 
In this step we extract each level domain and ignore the top level domain which may confuses the classifier. For 
split into  
 
 Character Frequency Statistic 
After the preprocessing of the top 100,000 normal domain names published by Alexa, each bigram appeared in 
the domains counts once. Then we can calculate the character frequency of each bigram to form a character 
frequency table. The top 10 bigram characters in character frequency table are list in Table 1.  For example, if all 
google   of 
the bigrams and the character frequency table is each bigram frequency equaling  1/12. 
Table 1 Top 10 bigram character in character frequency table 
Ranking Bigram Occurrence Number Frequency 
1 s,$ 14692 0.013936 
2 i,n 14033 0.013311 
3 $,c 12997 0.012328 
4 e,$ 12478 0.011836 
5 e,r 11993 0.011376 
6 c,o 11305 0.010723 
7 a,n 10479 0.00994 
8 r,e 10460 0.009922 
9 a,r 10089 0.00957 
10 e,s 9580 0.009087 
 
 Score Calculating 
In this step we first preprocess the normal domain names and DNS tunnel domain names used for training. And 
then we use the character frequency table mentioned above to calculate the score of each domain name with the 
score mechanism described in subsection 3.2. 
Table 2 DNS Tunnel domain names scores V.S. Normal domain names scores for training data 
 DNS Tunnel domain names scores Normal domain names scores 
min 0.0013 4.3700e-004 
max 0.0029 0.1743 
mean 0.0019 0.0303 
median 0.0018 0.0239 
mode 0.0018 0.0504 
standard deviation 2.4148e-004 0.0232 
range 0.0016 0.1739 
 
 Classifier Training 
After calculating the score of normal domain names and DNS tunnel ones, we get the distribution of them and 
calculate the threshold which will make the classifier produce the least false positive. Normal domain name score 
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distribution and DNS tunnel domain name score distribution are shown in Figure 4. Some parameters about the two 
datasets are shown in Table 2. The scores of DNS tunnel domain names are focus on a small range with a low score 
while the scores of normal domain names have a wide distribution. The mean number and medium number of the 
scores are so dense and the points of normal domain name scores is sparse relatively. The relationship between the 
threshold of score and accuracy is shown in Table 3. Therefore the threshold of score is set 0.0027 to get the highest 
accuracy. 
 
 
Figure 4 Normal domain name score distribution VS DNS tunnel domain name score distribution 
Table 3 the threshold of the classifier selecting 
Threshold Score False Positive False Negative Accuracy 
0.0025 0.0106 0.0037 0.9857 
0.0026 0.0111 0.0015 0.9874 
0.0027 0.0118 0.0006 0.9875 
0.0028 0.0124 0.0001 0.9874 
0.0029 0.0131 0 0.9869 
4.3. On-Line Classifying Mode 
The workflow of on-line classifying is shown in the below half part of Figure 3. We first do the same 
preprocessing as do in the off-line training part. Next we calculate the score of a monitored domain names with the 
same character frequency table. Then we compare the score with the threshold and finally classify the domain name. 
4.4. Evaluation Results 
In this subsection, we present the experiment results of our evaluation. We show that the approach can 
distinguish DNS Tunnel domain names and normal ones in real time. The executing time of classifying 20,000 
domain names is shown in Table 4 and the experiment is done on a computer with a 2.33GHz CPU and 16G 
memory. The average total executing time for classifying 20,000 monitored domain names is 751.2 milliseconds. 
Therefore the system can process 26624 domain names per second which is sufficient for most LAN.  The 
classification result is shown in Table 3. It shows our approach can get a high accuracy of 98.74% and low false 
positive of 1.24%. 
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Figure 5 Domain Name Classification Result 
Table 4 Executing time of classifying 20,000 domain names 
Test number Preprocessing and Scoring time(ms) Classifying time(ms) Total time (ms) 
1 770 4.9 774.9 
2 770 2.7 772.7 
3 660 3.0 663.0 
4 840 2.8 842.8 
5 700 2.5 702.5 
Average 748 3.18 751.2 
 
5. Discussion & Conclusion 
There are still  some potential way for evasion of our approach in real networks The tags in DNS tunnels domain 
names may be used to evade detection if they are consist of high character frequency bigram and long enough. But 
more features could be used to classify domain names to promote the correct rate and avoid the evasion. For 
example, the length of domain names could be added to character frequency analysis in real time detection. 
In this paper, we present an approach that can detect DNS tunnel in real time. We design a score mechanism that 
can distinguish DNS tunnel domain names and normal domain names based on bigram character frequency. Our 
experiment uses real-world data to evaluate our approach, which includes normal domain names published by Alexa 
and DNS tunnel domain names produced by DNScat. The results demonstrate that our approach get higher accurate 
in identifying DNS tunnel domain names compared with other existed methods. 
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